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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20000340-CA

vs.
WALLACE WAYNE DEAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from convictions entered upon guilty pleas to child abuse, a
second degree felony, and child abuse, a class A misdemeanor, both in violation of
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-109 (2000), and assault, a class B misdemeanor, in

violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (2000), in the Fifth Judicial Distnct, Iron
County, the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).

1

ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1 Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea where (a) defendant's first challenge to the plea did not
adequately identify the alleged error and (b) his second challenge had neither
factual nor legal support?
"The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard, incorporating a clearly erroneous standard for findings of
fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 14,
26 P 3d 203.
2. Has defendant established that the trial court obviously violated rule 11,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in taking defendant's plea and that, but for those
violations, defendant would not have pled guilty?
To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: (1) an
error occurred; (u) the error was obvious; and (in) the error was harmful. State v
Dunn, 850 P 2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) If any one of these elements is missing,
there is no plain error. Id. at 1209.
3 May this court address defendant's claim that the trial court improperly
denied him a continuance and, without adequate warning, forced him to represent
himself at sentencing, where no record evidence supports the claim9
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Where there is no record to indicate otherwise, a reviewing court presumes
the correctness of the proceedings below. See State v Mead, 2001 UT 58,1f 48, 27
P 3d 1115 Absent record evidence to support a contention of error, the reviewing
court does not address it. Id.
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
included in Addendum A:
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-109 (2000),
§ 76-5-102 (2000), and
§ 77-13-6 (1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant was charged with three counts of child abuse—a second degree
felony and two class A misdemeanors—in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5109 (2000). R. 1-4. He was also charged with commission of domestic violence in
the presence of a child, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-109.1 (1998); assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-102 (2000); and making a threat against life or property, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-107 (1988). R. 1-4.
Defendant pled guilty to one count each of child abuse, a second degree
felony; child abuse, a class A misdemeanor; and assault, a class B misdemeanor.
R. 25. In exchange for his plea, the prosecution agreed to file an amended
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information charging only those counts and to forego filing additional charges based
on statements defendant allegedly made threatening his children should they testify
against him. R. 31-32. In connection with his plea, defendant executed a statement
which included a paragraph describing each of the rights detailed in rule 11, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. R. 29-35. The paragraph detailing defendant's right
to a trial advised him of his right to a jury trial or, should he elect to waive that
right, to a trial by the court. R. 34. The paragraph did not include the phrases
"speedy trial" and "impartial jury." Id The statement also advised defendant that a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea had to be made within thirty days of the entry of
the plea and would be granted only upon a showing of good cause. R. 32.
Defendant was represented at the March 8, 2000 plea-taking by public
defender Dale W. Sessions. R. 25. Sentencing was set for April 11, 2000. Id On
April 10, 2000, D. Bruce Oliver entered an appearance of counsel and filed a
motion to withdraw defendant's guilty plea. R. 38-40. In his memorandum in
support of the motion to withdraw, Mr. Oliver alleged that the plea had been taken
in violation of rule 11, stating that "there are two significant departures from
procedures which have been used by the courts to ensure a person due process
and[/]or equal protection under the law " R. 43. He did not indicate what those
departures were. He further alleged that the defendant had not been advised of the
time limits for withdrawing his guilty plea. Id
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Although Mr. Oliver entered an appearance, Mr. Sessions did not move to
withdraw. Sentencing was held on April 11, 2000, with Mr. Sessions, but not Mr.
Oliver, present. R. 45-47. The minutes note that Mr. Sessions had received Mr.
Oliver's paperwork. Id. at 46. The minutes do not state whether argument was
held on the motion to withdraw. Id. The minutes, together with other record
documents, do indicate that the court denied the motion to withdraw because (1)
defendant had not shown good cause and (2) the motion was untimely. R. 46, 4853.
The minutes also show that defendant asked to represent himself and that the
court released Mr. Sessions as counsel, but asked him to remain to assist defendant.
R. 46. Defendant has not brought up a transcript of the sentencing hearing on
appeal. The record therefore does not indicate the nature of the colloquy that
occurred in connection with defendant's decision to represent himself.
The court also asked defendant whether he would like to go forward on an
order to show cause in a 1996 case (apparently a distribution of marijuana case
where defendant was sentenced to supervised probation) or whether he would prefer
to wait for Mr. Oliver to represent him. Id.; see also PSI at 1, 7. Defendant stated
that he would like Mr. Oliver to assist with the order to show cause. R. 46. The
court observed that the 1996 case could be continued, but that this case would go

forward. Id. The minutes do not indicate that defendant moved for a continuance
in this case. Id. No motion for a continuance is included elsewhere in the record.
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate pnson term of one-to-fifteen
years. Id. at 45. The trial court filed its judgment, sentence, and commitment on
Apnl 17, 2000. Defendant timely appealed—once through Mr. Oliver on Apnl 20,
2000; once pro se on Apnl 26, 2000; and once through public defender Floyd W.
Holm on Apnl 28, 2000. R. 59, 62, 64. In a document also dated Apnl 28, 2000,
Mr. Sessions withdrew and Mr. Holm entered his appearance as "Public Defender
Appointee." R. 65.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
As defendant pled guilty and no trial was held, the statement of the facts is
taken from the "Official Version of the Offense" and other information in the PSI.
On January 7, 2000, defendant, who was angry with his dying 85-pound wife,
repeatedly punched her in the stomach with a closed fist. PSI at 2-4, 10. When
defendant's eleven-year-old son heard his mother screaming for help, he tried to
stop defendant and give his mother some Ibuprofen and some wine. Id. Defendant
then grabbed the boy by the neck and tned to choke him, telling the boy not to
touch the Ibuprofen or the wine. Id. Defendant said, "[Djon't touch that or I'll
break vour hands." Id. at 4. A friend of the child observed the incident and
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corroborated the boy's account. Id. Defendant's wife died the following day. Id
at 2.
This incident was only one in defendant's long history of physically abusing
his wife and children. Id at 1-5, 9-10. Two other incidents are relevant to this
case. During the year preceding the January 2000 beating of his dying wife,
defendant got drunk, heated a knife on the stove, and placed it in his fifteen-yearold daughter's pierced and infected belly button. Id. at 3. He characterized this act
as an attempt "to cauterize it." Id. While picking his daughter up at a football
game that same year, defendant backhanded her across the face approximately ten
times, blackening two of her eyes. Id. In addition, defendant's wife left a journal
with entries from 1991 through 1994, descnbmg how defendant repeatedly beat her.
Id. at 9-10.
On approximately February 4, 2000, an Adult Probation and Parole
investigator conducted a field visit at defendant's residence in connection with
defendant's supervised probation. Id. at 2. Defendant had been drinking alcohol,
in violation of his parole, and was taken into custody. Id. At the time of
defendant's arrest, defendant's son told a police officer about the incident the day
before his mother's death. Id. The children were subsequently interviewed and
gave additional details about defendant's abuse. Id. The children both indicated
that they are afraid of their father. Id. at 3-4.
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Following his arrest, defendant threatened to retaliate against his children
based on his belief that they were responsible for his incarceration Id at 14
Defendant apparently also threatened his children with harm should they testify
against him See R. 31-32.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion
to withdraw his guilty plea Defendant argued that the plea was not taken pursuant
to rule 11, Utah Rules of Cnminal Procedure Defendant, did not, however explain
why the plea violated rule 11 Defendant also argued the trial court should have
granted his motion to withdraw because the court had not informed him of the 30day time limit within which to make the motion Failure to advise a defendant of
the time limits for filing a motion to withdraw is not a ground for setting aside a
plea In any case, the record demonstrates that the trial court did, in fact, advise
defendant of the 30-day limit.
The trial court did not plainly err when it informed defendant of his right to a
jury trial, but failed to specify that he had a right to a speedy trial before an
impartial jury. Where defendant neither objected at the plea-taking nor raised the
claim in the context of his motion to withdraw, his claim is not properly before this
Court In any case, failure to use the words speedx and impartial was not error
The trial court's colloquy sufficed to ensure that defendant knew of his rights and
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understood the consequences of his decision to plead guilty In addition, defendant
had an extensive criminal history Defendant's experience in the courts in
connection with these convictions sufficed to communicate his rule 11 rights
Even if error occurred, it was not obvious Defendant's relies on State v
Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, 5 P 3d 1222, for his hyper-technical reading of
rule 11 This Court's opinion in Tarnawiecki was filed after defendant's pleataking and after the court denied his motion to withdraw his plea. Tarnauiecki
therefore could not have guided the tnal court Moreover, Tarnawiecki's
precedential value is undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions
Furthermore, any error was harmless Defendant has not demonstrated that he
would not have pled guilty, but for the tnal court's failure to specify his nght to a
speedy tnal before an impartial jury.
Finally, the record does not support defendant's allegation that the tnal court
denied his motion for a continuance to secure the presence of appointed counsel at
sentencing Similarly, no record evidence supports his allegation that the tnal court
failed to adequately advise him of the dangers of self representation.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY
PLEA WHERE DEFENDANT'S FIRST CHALLENGE TO THE PLEA
DID NOT ADEQUATELY IDENTIFY THE ALLEGED ERROR AND
HIS SECOND CHALLENGE HAD NEITHER FACTUAL NOR LEGAL
SUPPORT
Defendant claims that the tnal court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Br Aplt. at 17, 19. The trial court, however,
properly denied the motion where (a) defendant's first challenge to the plea did not
specify the error claimed and (b) his second challenge had neither factual nor legal
support.
The tnal court denied defendant's motion to withdraw "on the grounds set
forth in the State's response." R. 53. The State argued below, as it does now on
appeal, that defendant had not articulated his first challenge and that his second
challenge was without legal or factual basis. R. 50-51 (Response to Motion to
Withdraw Guilty Plea).1 Defendant therefore had not "show[n] 'good cause' to set
aside his guilty plea." Id. at 51.
The State also argued that defendant's motion was untimely. Defendant's motion
was untimely under then-controlling precedent requinng that defendant make his motion
within thirty davs following the plea-taking. See State v Price, 837 P 2d 578 (Utah App
1992) (overruled bx State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, «1 11, 31 P 3d 528). Defendant's motion
would apparently be timely, however, ider precedent established in the mtenm. See
Ostler, 2001 UT 68, t 11, holding tha~ \ie 30-day limitation runs from the date of final
judgment.
10

A.

Defendant did not adequately identify his first claim of error
On the day before sentencing, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty

plea, together with a supporting memorandum. R. 39-44. The motion stated that
"defendant was not aware of his rights at the time of the entry of his plea, nor did
he realize the ramifications of the entry of his guilty plea." R. 40. The motion
stated that "[defendant's counsel believes that the plea was not taken pursuant to
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6, and
that it violated defendant's due process and equal protection rights." Id It did not,
however, suggest how the plea violated rule 11, due process, or equal protection
The supporting memorandum made two arguments. Defendant first argued
that a judge must "ensure that the plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily" and
that failure to comply with rule 11 is good cause for the withdrawal of a plea. Id
at 43-44. Defendant quoted rule 11(e) and then stated: "In the case at bar, there are
two significant departures from procedures which have been used by the courts to
ensure a person due process and[/]or equal protection under the law." Id at 43
The memorandum did not, however, specify what "significant departures" had
occurred. The record does not indicate any oral argument on the motion. Id
This Court reviews a tnal court's denial of a motion to withdraw for an abuse
of discretion State v Martinez, 2001 LT 12, <! 14, 26 P 3d 203. Where defendant
did not specify the basis for his challenge, the tnal court could not reasonably have
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been expected to ferret out unspecified errors in the plea colloquy, including the
errors defendant now claims on appeal. See State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546
(Utah App. 1998) (grounds claimed "must be specific enough to give the trial court
notice of the very error of which counsel complains"). The trial court properly
rejected defendant's claim of unspecified errors.
B.

Defendant's second challenge had neither factual nor legal support.
Defendant next argued that "[t]he second possible departure from Rule 11 in

this case is that at no time was the defendant advised of the time limits for
withdrawing his guilty plea." R. 43. The record, however, indicates that defendant
was advised of the 30-day limit in the statement he executed in connection with his
plea. See R. 32. The trial court established that defendant had read and initialed
the paragraphs of the statement, including paragraph 10, which detailed the time
limit. R. 71:3. The record does not support defendant's claim that the trial court
failed to inform him of the time limits.
Further, rule ll(8)(f), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically provides
that c'[f]ailure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty . . . is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be
the ground for extending the time to make a motion." Even had the trial court
failed to inform defendant of the time limits, that failure would not have constituted
good cause for setting aside his plea.
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In sum, defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR WHEN IT INFORMED
DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY, BUT DID NOT
USE THE MODIFIERS SPEEDY BEFORE TRIAL AND IMPARTIAL
BEFORE JURY
A.

Defendant's claim is not properly before this Court.
Defendant claims on appeal that the tnal court plainly erred because, while it

advised defendant of his right to a jury trial, it did not expressly state that he was
entitled to a speedy tnal before an impartial jury'. Br. Aplt. at 14-17. Defendant
argues that this Court should hear his claim, even though he did not object at the
plea-taking and did not raise the claim in his subsequent motion to withdraw.
Utah precedent permits a defendant to challenge his guilty plea in two ways:
either on direct appeal or by collateral attack. Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 344
(Utah App. 1988). If the challenge is made on direct appeal, the challenge "must
be in the context of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the denial of which can be
appealed." Id. If the challenge to the guilty plea is made collaterally, the challenge
may be to the plea itself, and need not challenge the denial of a motion to
withdraw. Id. at 344-345.
Defendant in this case filed a motion to withdraw. R. 39-40. That motion,
however, did not claim the errors now alleged on appeal. Defendant does not
13

therefore challenge the denial of his motion to withdraw. Rather, he directly
challenges the plea itself, asking this Court to review the record of the plea-taking
for errors not specified in the motion to withdraw. This is an impermissible route
to appellate review. See Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d at 341. This court should
therefore decline to address defendant's claim on appeal.2
B.

Assuming arguendo that defendant's claim is properly before this court,
defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court obviously violated
rule 11 and that, but for those violations, defendant would not have pled
guilty.
Assuming arguendo that defendant's plain error claim is properly before this

Court, it nevertheless lacks merit. Defendant claims that the trial court committed
plain error because it failed to inform defendant of "the right to a speedy public
trial before an impartial jury," as required by rule 11(e)(3). Br. Aplt. at 14. To
establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: (i) an error
occurred; (ii) the error was obvious, and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). If any one of these elements is missing, there is
no plain error. Id. at 1209. Defendant cannot demonstrate error, obviousness, or
harm. His claim therefore fails.

:

If defendant believes that the trial court's failure to inform him of his right to a
speedy trial before an impartial jury made his plea involuntary, he is not without remedy.
See Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991 & n. 6 (Utah 1993) (conviction on the basis of
,4
guilty plea [that] was in fact not knowing and voluntary" constitutes deprivation of
constitutional right, addressable on collateral review).
14

1. No error occurred.
No error occurred. The trial court complied with the mandates of rule 11.
Under rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court may not
accept a plea of guilty before making certain findings, most of which involve the
defendant's having been advised of his constitutional rights. Thus, "the trial court
[must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and
voluntary and establish on the record that defendant knowingly waived his or her
constitutional rights." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11, 22 P.3d 1242 (quotation
marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in Visser). Utah precedent has "described
the court's duty in this regard as a duty of strict compliance." Id. (citing State v.
Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996)). "Strict compliance, however, does not
mandate a particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed." Id. (citing State v.
Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 996 (Utah 1993); State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah
1991)). On the contrary, "the substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that
defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of
their decision to plead guilty. That goal should not be overshadowed or
undermined by formalistic ritual." Id.
Defendant's rights were laid out in detail in the statement he made in
connection with his plea. R. 29-35. The trial court ascertained that defendant had
read and signed every paragraph of the statement. R. 51. The trial court thereby
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informed defendant that he had a right to "a tnal by jury" and that, in connection
with that nght,

•

he would have the nght to confront the witnesses against him,
he had the nght to have witnesses subpoenaed to testify in his behalf;
he could, if he so chose, testify in his own behalf; and
he could, however, choose not to testify, and the jury would be instructed that
this could "not be held against [him]".

R. 34; see also Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 12 (findings may be based on plea affidavit)
The tnal court also instructed defendant that the State must prove every element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury verdict must be unanimous
R. 34. Further, the tnal court told him that by entenng a plea, he would waive his
tnal nghts. R. 33.
This painstaking enumeration of defendant's nghts sufficed to meet the
requirements of rule 11(e)(3). The tnal court's omission of the words speedy and
impartial did not defeat the substantive goal of rule 11. The tnal court's procedure
was sufficient to ensure that defendant knew of his nghts and understood the basic
consequences of his decision to plead guilty To require that the tnal court use the
words speedy, impartial, or, for that matter, public, would be to overshadow and
undermine the substantive goal by imposing "formahstic ntual."
Defendant argues that State v Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, 5 P 3d 1222,
mandates the use of the terms. See Br Aplt at 16 Tarnawiecki does appear to
require the terms. Tarnawiecki's requirements, however, appear inconsistent with
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subsequent precedent established by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Martinez,
2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 203. In Martinez, the defendant moved in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, claiming it was not knowing and voluntary. Id. at 1[ 11.
The district court denied the motion, and Martinez appealed. Id. at U 13. On
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court had "strictly complied with
the constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of [Martinez's] guilty plea,"
including the mandates of rule 11. Id. at f 26. The Court reasoned that "strict
compliance creates a presumption that the plea was voluntary" and affirmed. Id. at
f 21. The opinion observed, by way of background, that defendant understood his
rights, among them, "the right to a jury trial and that the matter was set for trial."
Id. at f 4. In its analysis of defendant's rule 11 challenge, the Court again
enumerated the rights that defendant acknowledged and understood, among them,
"the right to a jury trial." Id. at f 23. Although nothing in the case suggested that
the trial court had used the terms impartial and speedy, the Court nonetheless held
that the colloquy "strictly complied" with rule 11. Martinez therefore is
inconsistent with the decision in Tarnaxviecki and, by implication, overrules it.
Finally, defendant had an extensive criminal history, including several
convictions for theft by receiving stolen property and one conviction for distribution
of marijuana. See PSI at 6-7. Defendant's experience in the courts in connection
with these convictions must have "communicated [defendant's rights] at least as
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much as would the mere oral recitation of the "right to a speedy public trial before
an impartial jury " See State v Visser. 2000 UT 88, ^f 13, 22 P 3d 1242 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (holding that personal trial experience may suffice to
communicate certain rule 11 rights).
2.

Error, if any, was not obvious.
Even if error occurred, it was not obvious Error is not obvious "where there

is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court " State v Ross, 951 P 2d 236,
239 (Utah App. 1997). Defendant's complaint rests on a hyper-technical reading of
rule 11. Defendant cites only to State v Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, 5 P.3d
1222, for his reading of the rule. The decision of this Court in Tarnawiecki was
filed June 15, 2000, following defendant's plea-taking and after the trial court had
denied his motion to withdraw his plea. Therefore, Tarnawiecki could not have
guided the trial court.3
Further, the precedential value of the portion of Tarnawiecki mandating the
use of the terms "speedy" and "public" has been undermined by Martinez, 2001 UT
12, and Visser, 2000 UT 88, both decided after Tarnawiecki.

The Tarnawiecki court held that the failure to inform a defendant of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury constituted plain error
Tarnawiecki relied on State v Visser, 1999 LT App 19, 973 P 2d 998, which was
subsequently reversed on certioran review See State \ Visser, 2000 UT 88, 22 P 3d
1242
18

3.

Error, if any, was not harmful.
To establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that the error was

harmful. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. While noncompliance with rule 11 may
establish error and, in some cases, even obvious error, it does not necessarily
establish prejudice. See Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, If 15 ("it is difficult to see
how the court's failure in this case to discuss the possibility that defendant may
serve no time and incur no fine [as required by rule 11(e)(5)] would result in a
harmful error").4
Plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel share a "common standard" of
prejudice. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31 n.14, 12 P.3d 92 (citing State v.
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989); State v Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822
(Utah App. 1994); State v. Ellifiitz. 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992)). A
defendant claiming that his guilty plea resulted from counsel's ineffectiveness must
show " ; a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have

4

A "voluntary and knowing" guilty plea does not require stnct compliance with
rule 11 to be constitutionally sound under either the federal or state constitution. See
Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991-92 (Utah 1993). "Rule 11 is a device for
protecting the right [of voluntariness] but the scope of Rule 11 does not equal the more
limited scope of the constitutional right." Id at 992 (quotation and citation omitted).
Instead, compliance with rule 11 merely "creates a presumption that the plea was
voluntarily entered." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, U 11, 1 P 3d 1108. And while the
"substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby
understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty," that goal "should not
be overshadowed or undermined by formahstic ritual." Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^1 11.
19

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" Parsons v Barnes, 871
P 2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994) (quoting Hill v Lockhart. 474 U S. 52, 59 (1985)).
Thus, a defendant attempting to show plain error under rule 11 must demonstrate
that but for the tnal court's omissions, he would not have pleaded guilty but would
have insisted on going to tnal. He must establish that an obvious error so infected
the plea-taking that the appellate court no longer has confidence in its underlying
validity, because the plea was less than knowing and voluntary. Cf Dunn, 850 P 2d
at 1208-09; Visser, 2000 UT 88,ffl[ 11-14
In other words, where a defendant claims plain error in the taking of his plea,
the test for prejudice is driven not by the requirements of rule 11, but by traditional
plain error analysis.5
The United States Supreme Court, addressing violations of rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, has held that a defendant who first claims a
rule 11 violation on appeal must meet the plain error standard. United States v
Vonn, 122 S Ct. 1043, 1046 (2002). As part of his responsibility to meet this
burden, a defendant must demonstrate "that his 'substantial rights' were affected "
"The court of appeals strayed from this analysis in Tamawiecki by presuming
prejudice, i.e., that failure to advise Tamawiecki of her nght to a speedy tnal before an
impartial jury "is prejudicial and therefore harmful " Tamawiecki, 2000 UT App 186,
1| 18. Tamawiecki should have been required to demonstrate that, but for the tnal court's
violations of rule 11, she would not have pled guilty Otherwise, omission of the words
speedy and impartial, like the failure to advise Tamawiecki of her minimum possible
sentence as required by rule 11(e)(5), would have been harmless.
20

Id. at 1048. Moreover, "because relief on plain-error review is in the discretion of
the reviewing court, a defendant has the further burden to persuade the court that
the error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Rule 11's federal counterpart includes a subsection (h) entitled "Harmless
Error/' Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h). That subsection provides, "Any variance from the
procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded." This provision "rejects the extreme sanction of automatic reversal."
Advisory Committee Note (1983 amendment).
Although Utah's rule 11 contains no harmless error provision, its plain error
analysis does. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. The United States Supreme Court's
decision in Vonn is thus a useful guide to the application of harmless error analysis
in the rule 11 context. To show that a rule 11 violation was harmful, a defendant
must demonstrate that the errors significantly influenced or materially affected his
decision to plead guilty. This is another way of saying that, but for the errors, he
would not have pled guilty.
Defendant made no record in the trial court of why he decided to plead guilty
and how the court's omissions materially affected that decision. He did not testify
that he would have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty had he only known he
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was entitled to a speedy tnal by an impartial jury The record does not demonstrate
prejudice
III.
THIS COURT MAY NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S CLAIM
THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED HIM A
CONTINUANCE AND, WITHOUT ADEQUATE WARNING,
FORCED HIM TO REPRESENT HIMSELF AT SENTENCING,
WHERE NO RECORD EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CLAIM
Defendant apparently elected to represent himself at his sentencing hearing
R 46 (Minutes, Sentencing) Defendant alleges that the tnal court denied his
motion for a continuance that would have permitted him to secure the presence of
retained counsel at his sentencing heanng. Br. Aplt. at 20. Defendant further
alleges that "the tnal court did not conduct the colloquy as required and therefore
the record fails to show that [he] was advised of the dangers and disadvantages of
self representation . . or that his choice was made with eyes open." Id at 25
Defendant's allegations are without support in the record. This Court must
therefore assume the regularity of the proceedings in the tnal court. See State v
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 11 "When a defendant predicates error to [a reviewing
court], he has the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an
adequate record. Absent that record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a
unilateral allegation which the review court has no power to determine " State v
Wulffenstein, 657 P 2d 289, 293 (Utah 1( -2) The reviewing court u «mply cannot
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rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported
by the record." Id.
Defendant has not included a transcript of the sentencing hearing in the record
on appeal. The pleadings volume contains the only record evidence of that hearing.
See R. 45-47 (Minutes, Sentencing), 55-57 (Judgment, Sentence, Commitment).
The minutes of the proceeding indicate that defendant asked to represent himself
and that the court released his attorney, Dale Sessions, as counsel. R. 46. The
minutes do not further detail the colloquy that attended the release of counsel
except to indicate that the court asked Mr. Sessions to remain to assist defendant
should he need counsel for the sentencing proceeding. Id.
Further, the minutes do not indicate that defendant requested a continuance to
secure the assistance of retained counsel for the sentencing hearing. See id. The
minutes do indicate that the trial judge asked defendant if he would like to postpone
proceedings on an order to show cause in a 1996 case. Id. When defendant
answered that he would like to have counsel's assistance in that case, the trial judge
continued it. Id. The contrasting absence of any minute entry detailing either a
motion to continue or a ruling on that motion suggests that no motion was made.
In any case, absent a transcript of the sentencing proceeding, the record does
not support defendant's allegations that he requested and was denied a continuance
or that the he was not fairly advised of the dangers of self representation. Absent
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record evidence to the contrary, this Court must "assume the regularity of
proceedings below." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 11. This Court therefore
may not address defendant's claim.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
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Addenda

Addendum A

76-5-109. Child abuse.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Child" means a human being who is under 18 years of age.
(b) "Child abuse" means any offense described in Subsection (2) or (3), or in Section 76-5-109.1.
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of a child which impairs the physical
condition of the child, including:
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin;
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion;
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare and which is not a serious
physical injury as defined in Subsection (l)(d).
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of injuries which seriously impairs
the child's health, or which involves physical torture or causes serious emotional harm to the child, or
which involves a substantial risk of death to the child, including:
(i) fracture of any bone or bones;
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of the brain, whether caused by blows, shaking, or
causing the child's head to impact with an object or surface;
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot water, or those caused by placing a hot object upon
the skin or body of the child;
(iv) any injury caused by use of a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601:
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the same person, either at the
same time or on different occasions;
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body;
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional harm, severe developmental
delay or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's ability to function;
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of a bodily member, limb, or organ;
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease breathing, even if resuscitation is successful
following the conduct; or
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or malnutrition that jeopardizes the
child's life.
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having the care or custody of
such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a child is guilty of an
offense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the second degree;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care or custody of such
child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as
follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor.
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with treatment by spiritual means
alone through prayer, in lieu of medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and practices of an
established church or religious denomination of which the parent or legal guardian is a member or
adherent shall not, for that reason alone, be deemed to have committed an offense under this section.
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76-5-102. Assault.
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another:
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another:
or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or \iolence, that causes or creates a substantial risk of
bodily injur}' to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another: or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to another.
Amended by Chapter 170, 2000 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_05003 ZIP 2,101 Bytes
Sections in this Chaptcr|Chapters in this ritle|All Titles|Legislative Home Page
Last revised: Thursday, Juiv 12, 2001
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77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. (1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to
conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with
leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion and shall be made
within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Amended by Chapter 16, 1994 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 77_0E007.ZIP 3,653 Bytes
Sections in this ChapterjChapters in this Title|AH Titles|Legislative Home Page
Last revised: Friday, November 30, 2001

Addendum B

FILED,
NOV 1 4 2000
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

* * SIS™!^ C O U N r
IRON OOUKTY

IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

iU

OIPUTY CLERK

ORIGINAL

STATE O F UTAH,
Plaintiff,)
vs .

Case No. 001500153 FS

WALLACE WAYNE DEAN,
Defendant.)

Preliminary Hearing
Electronically recorded on
March 8, 2000

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE ROBERT T, BRAITHWAITE
Fifth District Court Judge

APPEARANCES:
For tne State:

DAVID E. DOXEY
Deputy County Attorney
97 North M a m Street
Suite 1
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435)586-6694

For the Defendant:

DALE SESSIONS
5 North M a m Street
Suite 307
Cedar City, Utah 84721
Telephone: (435

HCED

'ranscribed oy: Beverly Lowe, RPR/CSR/CCT

^

^ 0 2000

COURT .If APPEALS

1771 South California Avenue
Provo, Utah 34606
Telephone: l801)377-0027

^

# # •

•

p-CA

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on March 3, 2000)

3
4

THE COURT: We'll go back to the top of the calendar.
State of Utah versus Wallace Dean.

Are we ready on that case^

5

MR. DOXEY: Yes, your Honor.

6

THE COURT: Does this go forward?

7

MR. DOXEY: We need to make one quick change, your

8

Honor

9

THE COURT: All right.

10

MR. DOXEY: Your Honor, I think the defendant will

11

plead guilty

12

that Mr. Dean is going to plead guilty to Counts I, III and V.

13

Count I is child abuse, a second-degree felony.

14

child ab use, a Class A misdemeanor, and Count V is assault, a

15

Class 3 misdemeanor.

16

The nature of the agreement, your Honor, is

In addition —

Count III is

or in exchange for his pleas, the Stat*

17

will move to dismiss the remaining charges, and has agreed not

18

to fi:.e charges of witness tampering arising from alleged

19 1 threats to the Children.
20

THE COURT: First of all, does he want to waive nis

21

right to a preliminary hearing"1

22

MR. SESSIONS: He does.

23

THE COURT: He's held over for arraignment at this

24

time.

25

barga:-n, specific that nis Counsel nas ordered, that was

I have a statement of the defendant regarding plea

-31

initials by <sach o £ the 16 paragraphs.

2

MR. SESSIONS: Your Honor, while you're reviewing that

3

I would like to explain a couple o f things about this

4

agreement.

5
6
7

THE COURT . I see a lot of interlineation there on the
16-h.

Go ahe ad.
MR. SESSIONS: Okay, let's see, the first change, the

8

first time is paragraph 9.

9

the word coersion.

10

There was a word written above

It is stricken and initialed by me and my

client for the Court to disregard it.

11

THE COURT

12

MR. SESSIONS: Likewise, on paragraph 16 there was an

13

Information included at the bottom of the document, which has

14

been lined through and stricken.

15

client's initials, for the Court to disregard it as well.

16
17

Okay.

THE COURT: All right.

It has my initials and my

So are these your initials by

each of the :L6 paragraphs?

18

MR. DEAN: Yes, sir.

19

THE COJ5RT: Did you place them there after you first

20

read each and all 16 paragraphs?

21

MR. DEAN: Yes, sir.

22

THE COURT: And are you in agreement with what your

23

attorney just said regarding what' s written here, handwriting?

24

MR. DEAN: Yes, sir.

25

THE COURT. Okay.

What is your plea to Count I, child

abuse, sex abuse?
MR. DEAN: Guilty plea.
THE COURT: Count III, child abuse, a Class A seconddegree misdemeanor?
MR. DEAN: Guilty plea.
THE COURT: Count V, assault, a Class B misdemeanor?
MR. DEAN: Guilty.
THE COURT: All right.
dismissed.

The remaining counts are all

Factual basis?

MR. DOXEY: Yes, your Honor.

During 1999 the State's

evidence is the defendant heated up a knife, and placed it on
his daughter's stomach and burned her.
a result of this.

Then on January 7*h, 2000 the defendant beat

up his wife on the day before she died*
bed.

She still has a scar as

She was on her death

That is the allegation of the assault, and then his son

attempted to render aid to his mother, he grabbed his son by
the tnrcat and choked him.

That is the allegation for the

child abuse.
THE COURT: Okay.

I assume that the wife's death was

not -- we won't be looking at a murder case?
MR. DOXEY: It's not a muraer case, your Honor.
ceat ~er up.

He

She was dying of a kidney or a liver disease.

THE COURT: Anything you want to add to or dispute tnat
summary?
MR. SESSIONS: While my client does not agree with the

State's evidence, he understands that that is the State's
evidence, and that they would be aole to produce that evidence.
THE COURT: Do you engage in any alcohol or drugs,
including any prescription medication from a doctor that would
affect your judgment at this time?
MR. DEAN: No, sir.
THE COURT: Set this for sentencing with a pre-sentence
report.

We'll go with April llrn at 1:30 for the sentencing.
MR. DOXEY: Your Honor, there is a couple of other

matters I'd like the Court to take into consideration on this
case.
THE COURT: Oh, okay.
MR. DOXEY: Now that he's pled guilty to three counts,
the remainder has been dismissed, there are a few issues.

He

was originally brought before the Court on a no-bail warrant.
He'd like to have that removed, or recalled from the other
case, and I apologize I don't have a number, but there is
another case with that hold.
THE COURT: That's one that he's on supervised
probation?
MR. SESSIONS: Yes.

Then the other issue is in this

particular case I believe bail has ceen set at $2,500, and with
these cnanges, he —

and the understanding that he would help

cooperate, and he has assured me that he will cooperate with
the CSI in preparation, he would like to be released, be able

-6to make arrangements to move out of his home.
that.

He's aware of

So he would at least ask the Court to reduce bail to

a $5,000 bond, so that he can secure a bond and be released
between now and April 11th to make those arrangements.
THE COURT: State's position?
MR. DOXEY: Your Honor, the State opposes the motion
to reduce the bail and to lift the no-bail hold on him.
For the record, your Honor, in his previous cases,
case No. 961500370, a no-bail warrant —

a no-bail order,

rather, was placed on him for numerous reasons.
he nas

First, that

continued to violate his probation and disregard many

of the conditions of his probation.
Secondly, your Honor, the crimes which he has just
pled guilty to are extremely violent.

He has perpetrated

against his two children and his deceased wife.

Since the

investigation has begun, Mr. Dean has threatened to kill his
children if they testify against him.
We believe, your Honor, there's a substantial risk of
Mr. Dean hurting his children.

Right now they have to have

protective custody, but we believe there's a substantial risk
of -- we are in possession, your Honor, of a journal from his
wife that outline the defendant's actions throughout the year.
THE COURT: I don't deny the fact that he's been on,
then, for no other reason he's on probation with the Court
already, supervised, and his many serious offenses which he's

-7
1 I ]ust pled guilty, I can't imagine that he wouldn't receive at
2

least as many days in jail as are between now and sentencing.

3

The statute allows me to after a conviction, which has ]ust

4

occurred, to commit a person to jail pending sentencing, so

5

that's what I'm doing.

6

MR. DOXEY: Thank you, your Honor.

7

(Hearing concluded.)

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Addendum C

FIL^O
DA\ ID E DOXEY (-7506)
Deputy Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite si
PO Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone
(435) 586-6694
Facsimile
(435) 586-2737

5th H I ? - :

ot-puTvc-r' v.

rN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT
REGARDLNG PLEA BARGAIN,
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL, and
ORDER

vs.
Criminal No 001500153
WALLACE WAYNE DEAN
Judge ROBERT T BRAITHWAITE
Defendant
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT REGARDING PLEA BARGAIN
I, WALLACE WAYNE DEAN, the above-named Defendant, under oath, hereby
acknowledge that I have entered a plea of "guilty" to the offense(s) of Child Abuse (Count I), a
Second-Degree Felony, Child Abuse (Count III), Class A Misdemeanor, and Assault (Count V) a
Class B Misdemeanor as contained in the original Information on file against me in the aboveentitled Court, a copy of which I have received and read, and I understand the nature of the elements
of the offense for which I am pleading "guilty " I further understand the charge to which this plea
of "guilty" is entered is a Second-Degree Felonv, a Class A Misdemeanor, and a Class B
Misdemeanor and that I am entering such a plea voluntarily and of my own free will, after contemns
with my* Attorney, Dale Sessions, and with a knowledge and understanding of the following tacts
j' ! j \

I know that I have constitutional rights under the Constitutions ot L tah and the I nited

States to plead not guilty and to have a jury tnal upon the charge to which I have entered a plea o(
guilty, or to a tnal by the Court should I elect to waive a trial by jury. I know I have a right to be
represented by counsel and that I am in fact represented by Dale Sessions as my attorney.
\

J

l/%

I know that if I wish to have a trial in Court upon the charge, I have a right to confront

the witnesses against me by having them testify in open court in my presence and before the Court
and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I
have the right to have witnesses subpoenaed by the State at its expense to testify in Court on my
behalf and that I could, if I elected to do so, testify in Court on my own behalf, and that if I choose
not to do so, the jury can and will be told that this may not be held against me if I choose to have the
jury so instructed.
I } 1l t/J*'

* know that if I were to have a trial that the State must prove each and every element

of the crime charged to the satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt; that I would
have no obligation to offer any evidence myself; and that any verdict rendered by a jury, whether
it be that of guilty or not guilty, must be by a unanimous agreement of all jurors.
f \ irLr>-

I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of the Unite

states that 1 have a

right against self-incrimination or a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify
in Court upon trial unless I choose to do so.
, N i\l U 5.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted bv a jurv

or by the Court that I would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court
of Utah for review of the trial proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such
appeal, that those costs would be paid by the State without cost to me, and to have the assistance of

counsel on such appeal.
i

>

1/V'fe'

* ' c n o w l ^ a t {^

w

*s^t0

contest l

he charge against me, I need only plead "not guilty"

and the matter will be set for trial, at which time the State of Utah will have the burden of proving
each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before ajury, the verdict must
be unanimous. I know and understand that by entering a plea of "guilty," I am waiving my
constitutional rights as set out in the preceding paragraphs and that I am, in fact, fully incriminating
myself by admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of "guilty" is entered.
{

\ Jil jh>

I know that under the laws of Utah the possible maximum sentence that can and mav

be imposed upon my plea of "guilty" to the charge identified on page one of this Statement, and as
set out in the Amended Information, is as follows:
Count I: Child Abuse
(A)

a term of 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison

(B)

And/or fined in any amount not in excess of 510,000 dollars.

Count III: Child Abuse
(A)

a term of 1 year in the Iron County Jail.

(B)

And/or fined in any amount not in excess of S2500 dollars.

Count V: Assault
(A)

a term of six months in the Iron County Jail

(B)

And/or fined in any amount not in excess of S1,000

I further understand that the imprisonment may be for consecutive periods if my plea is to
more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon
another offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded "guilty," my plea in the
3

present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me I also know that [ ma\ be
ordered byjhe Court to make restitution to any victim or victims of my crime.
IAJ
* ^ o.
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I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of "guilty " does not mean that the Court

will not impose either a fine or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made
to me by anyone as to what the sentence will be if I plead "guilty" or that it \\ ill be made lighter
because of my "guilty" plea.
9
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No threats/coerc^yn. or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to induce me

to plead "guilty," and no promises, except those contained herein, have been made to me 1 know
that any opinions made to me, by my attorney or other persons, as to what he or they believe the
Court may do with respect to sentencing are not binding on the Court.
V^ i V 4t).

I know that under the laws of Utah should I desire to move the Court to set aside my

"guilty" plea entered in this case, I must do so within thirty (30) days of the entry of the pleas or mv
nght to do so will be lost. I further understand that a plea of "guilty" may be withdrawn only upon
a showing of good cause and with permission of the Court.
\ \\J H.

No promises of any kiofliiave been made to induce me to plead "suilty" except that

I have been told that if I do plead yguifty/*rlthg_.Sttite of- Utah hni nprccA tft-Ule-an-Amended

[utasmattefl therein charging me with Child Abuse, a Second-Degree Felony, Child Abuse a Class
A Misdemeanor, and Assault a Class B Misdemeanor as opposed to the original charge(s) ot Child
Abuse, a second-degree felony, Child Abuse, a class A misdemeanor Child Abuse, a class A
misdemeanor, Commission of Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child, a class A
Misdemeanor, Assault a class B Misdemenaor and Threat Against Life or Property, a Class B
Misdemeanor I also understand that if I plead guilty as set forth above, the State agrees to not file

additional charges for allegedly threatening my children if they testified against me. I am also d\\ are
that the State will recommend the preparation of a Presentence Investigation Repon. No other
promises have been made.

I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or

recommendations for probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for
sentencing made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecutor are not binding on the Court
and may not be approved or followed by the Court.
12.

I have read this Statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I

understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this
Statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct.
U r3
\ hj*^

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am J) 0

years of age, I have attended school through the

//

grade, and I can

read and understand the English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication,
or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea was made. I am not presently under the influence
of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants.
Olfti' I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease,
defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering
mv plea-.-.
VJ

16.

I have discussed the contents ot this Statement with my Attorney, and ask the Court

to accept my plea of "guilty" to the charges set forth in this Statement because during 1999 I did.
while in an intoxicated state, intentionally and knowingly burn my daughter with a knife that had
been he^eji^ip on the stove, and during on or about January 7, 2000,1 did grab my son b> the neck
|'V +21*'

UKJJ*
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and choked him to prevent him from giving Ibuprofen to my deceased wife, and that on that same
date, I did unlawfully hit my wife. These acts occurred in Iron County, State of Utah.
DATED Y

day of March, 2000

WALLACE WAYttE DEAN
Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for WALLACE WAYNE DEAN, the Defendant named abov e
and I know she has read the Statement, or that I have read it to him; and I discussed it with him and
believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropnate investigation, the elements of the cnme
and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated, and these, along
with the other representations and declarations made by the Defendant in the foregoing Statement.
are accurate and true.

A t t o r n e y s Defet
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against WrALL ACE W A Y \ E
DEAN, Defendant. I have reviewed the Statement of the Defendant and find that the declarations,
including the elements of the offense and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct
which constitutes the offense are true and correct No improper inducements, threats, or coercions

oc, ^

to encourage a plea have been offered to the Defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained
in this Statement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the Defendant for the offense for which the
plea is entered and acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest.

DAVID E. DOXEY
Deputy Iron County Attorney
ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement of Defendant Regarding Plea
Bargain and the foregoing Certificates of Counsel, the Court finds the Defendant's plea of "guilty"
is freely and voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that Defendant WALLACE WAYNE DEAN's
plea of "guilty" to the charges set forth in the foregoing Statement be accepted and entered.
The foregoing Statement of Defendant was signed before me this

o day of March, 2000.

ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE
District Court Judge

7
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Addendum D

D. Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: (801) 595-0300

OJ^.

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo

STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO WITHDRAW
GUILTY PLEA
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 001500153
WALLACE DEAN,
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite
Defendant.

Comes now the defendant, Wallace Dean, by and through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver,
and hereby moves this Court for a withdrawal of his Guilty Plea as the defendant was not
aware of his rights at the time of the entry of his plea, nor did he realize the ramificauons of
the entry of his guilty plea. Based upon information and belief. Defendant's counsel believes
that the plea was not taken pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah
Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1953, as amended) constitutes a violation of due process and deprived
the defendant equal protection.
Said motion is filed pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, Article I, Sections 7, 12, 11, 24, and 27 of the Utah State

GU
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Constitution, and Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Further, the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities is in support
of said motion and is incorporated herein and annexed hereto by this reference.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10* day of
April, 2000.
D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OFFAXING/MAILINC.
I hereby certify that I caused to be transmitted a telefacsimile to (43S) 586-2737
and I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY
PLEA, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: Scott M. Bums, IRON COUNTY ATTORNEYS
OFFICE, 97 North Main, Suite #1, P.O. Box 428, Cedar City, Utah 84720.
Dated this 8th day of July, 1998.

* *
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Addendum E

D. Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: (801) 595-0300

1
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No, 001500153
WALLACE DEAN,
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite
Defendant.

Comes now the defendant, Wallace Dean, by and through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver,
and hereby submits this memorandum of points and authorities in support of his Motion to
Withdraw Guilty Plea.

ARGUMENT
POINT L
At the time a plea of guilty or no contest is entered in any matter a judge has the
duty to ensure that the plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily.
A trial court's failure to comply strictly with R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting a

J
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guilty or no contest plea is good cause, as a matter of law, for die withdrawal of
that plea. State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied. 836
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991).
Rule 11 of the Utah rules of criminal Procedure provides as follows:
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill,
and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the
right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial
jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses,
the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea,
these rights are waived;
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea
is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those
elements;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if
so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw
the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
In the case at bar, there are two significant departures from procedures which
have been used by the courts to ensure a person due process and or equal protecaon under the
law.

POINT n.
The second possible departure from Rule 11 in this case is that at no time was
the defendant advised of the time limits for withdrawing his guilty plea. Immediately upon his
entry the Court only informed the defendant that he was being referred to Adult Probation &

2
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Parole for a pre-sentence investigation. This is a clear violauon of Rule 11(e). Subsecaon
(e)(7) provides:
The court. . . may not accept the plea until the court has found . . . the defendant has
been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea . . . .
This was not done in this case.
POINT PL
The defendant reserves the right to amend his points and may raise additional
points pertaining to Rule 11 violations that may become available to him upon review of the
transcript of the taking of the guilty plea.

CONCLUSION
This Court should allow Mr. Dean to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed in
the case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10* day of
April, 2000.
D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF FAXING/MATT INC.

I hereby certify that I caused to be transmitted a telefacsimile to (435) 586-2737
and I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUTLTY PLEA, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: Scott M.
Burns, IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, 97 North Main, Suite #1, P.O. Box 428,
Cedar City, Utah 84720.
Dated this 10* day of April, 2000.
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Addendum F

FILED
APR 1 1 2000
8th DISTRICT COURT
IRON OOUNTY
DEPUTY CLIRK
_

DAVID E.DOXEY (7506)
Deputy Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 42
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone:
(435) 586-6694
Facsimile:
(435) 586-2737

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY.
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA / RESPONSE
TO MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY
PLEA

vs.
CASE NO. 001500153
WALLACE DEAN
Defendant

JUDGE ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE

COMES NOW the State of Utah by and through Deputy Iron County Attorney David E.
Doxey, and hereby moves this court to strike the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea filed by D.
Bruce Oliver. Alternatively, the State responds to the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.
MOTION TO STRIKE
D. Bruce Oliver is not the defendant's attorney. To date, only Dale Sessions has entered
his appearance for and on behalf of the Defendant. Mr. Oliver has not filed an Appearance of
Counsel in the above-entitled matter. Therefore, the State moves this court to strike the

1
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unsupported Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA
A.

A Case of Buyer's Remorse-No "Good Cause" to Set Aside the Defendant's
Guilty Plea.

At the heart of the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea is a case of buyers
remorse. The Defendant cannot show ''good cause" to set aside his guilty plea as required by
Utah Code §77-13-6. Additionally, the Defendant cannot claim that his constitutional or Rule
11 rights have been violated.1 On March 8, 2000, the Defendant signed a Statement of the
Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain. Certificate of Counsel, and Order. That document explicitly
set forth every constitutional and Rule 11 right of the defendant (including all of the rights
complained of in Defendant's motion). The defendant read the document, signed every
paragraph, and signed the signature line. The defendant was asked and responded that he
entered his plea voluntarily and knowingly and after he had read and understood the document.
The Defendant motion makes no claim that he was incapacitated or otherwise physically or
mentally unable to enter his guilty plea.
The Defendant's motion states that there are two significant departures from the proper
procedure. The motion, however, fails to articulate the first claimed departure other than copying
the whole of Rule 11.

l

See. State v. Thorup. 841 P.2d 746. 748 (Utah 1993), State v. Truiillo-Martinez. 814
P.2d 596. 599-600 (Utah 1991), State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah App. 1988).

0n '< -

The second claimed departure is that the court violated Rule 11(e) by not informing the
defendant of the time period to set aside his guilty plea. Paragraph 10 of the aforementioned
document, specifically sets forth these requisite time limits as stated in Utah Code §77-13-6. The
defendant read and initialed paragraph 10. Furthermore, Rule 1 l(8)(f) specifically provides that
"failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty...is not ground for setting the plea aside." Clearly, the motion states no basis to set aside
the defendant's plea.
Finally, it is no surprise that the Defendant filed his motion only after the Presentence
Investigation Report came out. The Defendant's motion can only be seen as buyer's remorse as
there is no legal or factual basis to set aside his plea, and his motion was only filed after he
learned the presentence recommendation.
B.

Defendant's Motion is Time Barred.

The Defendant did not file his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea until thirty-two days after
he entered his guilty plea. The Defendant may not set aside his guilty plea, without stipulation of
all parties, after thirty days have passed since he entered his plea. Utah Code §77-13-6.
Therefore, the Defendant's motion is time barred.
C.

Rule 11 Sanctions

As the motion fails to state one legitimate claim that the defendant's constitutional or
Rule 11 rights were violated. The filing of the Defendant's motion merits Rule 11 sanctions.

OOi.jr,

against Mr. Oliver, for filing a frivolous motion. After reading the motion, one can only
conclude that Mr. Oliver did nothing to reasonably research the facts surrounding the entry of the
defendant's guilty plea. Nor did Mr. Oliver even allege that a particular constitutional right of
the defendant was violated. Therefore, if there is a unreasonable delay in the proceedings, as a
result of Mr. Oliver's motion, the court ought to assess sanctions against Mr. Oliver equal to the
costs of the Defendant's extended commitment in the Iron County Jail
Conclusion
Mr. Oliver's motion is totally without merit. Mr. Oliver has not entered his appearance,
and therefore, his motion should be stricken. Mr. Oliver has also not set forth one constitutional
or Rule 11 basis to set aside Mr. Dean's guilty plea. Rule 11 sanctions against Mr. Oliver should
be ordered for filing the frivolous Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.
DATED this 11 day of April, 2000

David E. Doxey
/
/
Deputy Iron County Attorney/
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CERTIFK
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid this
,_

J

-.\d\ K.-f April 2000 to the following address:

Dale Sessions
Cedar r\v
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Addendum < i

Ll-TH DISTP1TT COURT- CEDAR COURT
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 001500153 FS

WALLACE WAYNE DEAI I,
Defendant

.Judge;
;~ace-

ROBERT T\ BRAITKWPApril 11 2000

PRESENT
Clerk:
tammyc
Prosecutor: DAVID E. DOXEY
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): DALE SESSIONS
Ag e n c yi Fift h D i s t r ict Court
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November
Video
Tape Number:
041100

Tape Count

m.

CHARGES
1.

: wrts-c-i>i£^.~^ - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/03/200:
3. CHILD A3USE/NEGLECT - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/08/2C0C
r .ea
5. SIMPLE ASSAULT - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/08/2000 5uiltv Plea
6. 1HRZAT AGAINST LIFE/PROPERTY - Class B Misdemeanor
- Dispcsizion: *, 3 J 0 8/2 0 0 0 Declined Pros ecu t ion

Page 1
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Case No: 001500153
Date:
Apr 11, 2000
HEARING
TAPE: 041100
COUNT: 1:33 p.m.
On record. The Defendant is incarcerated. Mr. Sessions states ^e
received paperwork from Bruce Oliver's office. The court: denies
Mr. Oliver's motion.
COUNT: 2:0 9 p
Mr. Sessions states he has met with the Defendant, but the
Defendant would like to represent himself in these matters
Mr. Sessions is released by the court as counsel for tne
Defendant; however, he is asked to help the Defendant in case tne
Defendant needs counsel for these proceedings.
COUNT: 2:10 p
Mr. Doxey responds to the paperwork he received from Bruce Oliver
Mr. Sessions asks the court questions regarding his representing
the Defendant. Judge Braithwaite states his grounds for denying
Mr. Oliver's motion.
The court states the PSI refers to this case, as well as an older
one Case #961500370. Judge Braithwaite asks the Defendant if re ^s
ready to go forward on the allegations in Case #961500370, or if -e
would like to have Bruce Oliver here.
The Defendant would like Bruce Oliver here to help him on tne
Order to Show Cause proceedings on Case #961500370. Judge
Braithwaite states that the 96' case can be continued, as I C is net
yet ready, but that this case will go forward today.
COUNT: 2:21 p
The Defendant responds to the PSI and the agencies
recommendations.
COUNT: 2:30 p
Mr. Sessions makes comments regarding sentencing.
COUNT: 2:38 p
M
r. Doxey responds to the PSI and gives sentencing
recommendations.
COUNT: 2:42 p
The court sentences the Defendant to 1-15 years in the Utan State
Prison. The Defendant's other case #961500370 is re-ncticec for
5-2-00 at 2:30 p.m.

Page 2

Case Moi 001500153
Date:
Apr 11, 2000
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant s conviction of CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
To the IRON County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utan State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
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